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Abstract
Background: ‘One Health’ represents a call for health researchers and practitioners at the human, animal and
environmental interfaces to work together to mitigate the risks of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases
(EIDs). A One Health approach emphasizing inter-disciplinary co-operation is increasingly seen as necessary for
effective EID control and prevention. There are, however, socio-political, ethical and legal challenges, which must be
met by such a One Health approach.
Discussion: Based on the philosophical review and critical analysis of scholarship around the theory and practice of
One Health it is clear that EID events are not simply about pathogens jumping species barriers; they are comprised
of complex and contingent sets of relations that involve socioeconomic and socio-political drivers and
consequences with the latter extending beyond the impact of the disease. Therefore, the effectiveness of policies
based on One Health depends on their implementation and alignment with or modification of public values.
Summary: Despite its strong motivating rationale, implementing a One Health approach in an integrated and
considered manner can be challenging, especially in the face of a perceived crisis. The effective control and
prevention of EIDs therefore requires: (i) social science research to improve understanding of how EID threats and
responses play out; (ii) the development of an analytic framework that catalogues case experiences with EIDs,
reflects their dynamic nature and promotes inter-sectoral collaboration and knowledge synthesis; (iii) genuine
public engagement processes that promote transparency, education and capture people’s preferences; (iv) a set of
practical principles and values that integrate ethics into decision-making procedures, against which policies and
public health responses can be assessed; (v) integration of the analytic framework and the statement of principles
and values outlined above; and (vi) a focus on genuine reform rather than rhetoric.
Keywords: One health, Emerging infectious disease, Zoonoses, Bioethics, Health policy, Health law
* Correspondence: chris.degeling@sydney.edu.au
1Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, K25 Level 1, Medical
Foundation Building, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
2Marie Bashir Institute for Infectious Disease and Biosecurity, University of
Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Degeling et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Degeling et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:1307 
DOI 10.1186/s12889-015-2617-1
Background
The recent Ebolavirus (EBOV) outbreak in West Africa
and continuing human infections with a novel H7N9 in-
fluenza A virus in mainland China are salient reminders
of how human and nonhuman health are inextricably
linked. Nonhuman animals are the source of 70 % of
emerging and re-emerging infectious disease (EID)
threats to human health [1], and more than half of all
established human pathogens [2]. The threats posed by
EIDs are dynamic. EIDs are caused by pathogens that
can change their behaviour over time – either through
genetic modification or through changes in the patterns
and pathways of transmission [3]. Social, economic and
political systems can either promote or inhibit pathogen
transfer, and the incidence and pathogenicity of the dis-
ease [4]. While a lack of data makes quantitation diffi-
cult, EIDs and zoonoses account for a significant
proportion of the global disease burden [5]. EIDs and
emergence of zoonotic pathogens, including human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV), are direct causes of an esti-
mated 15 million deaths worldwide each year [6].
A One Health approach is increasingly considered to
be the most effective way of managing EID threats [7, 8]
because it represents an acknowledgement of certain
facts about the nature of disease, which are then de-
ployed to structure the response. One Health is
grounded in a recognition that human, animal and en-
vironmental health are interdependent [9], that animal
species provide a shared reservoir for pathogen exchange
and spread, and that many EIDs are driven by varied
and dynamic human-animal interactions [9, 10]. The re-
sponse One Health offers is to deconstruct the disciplin-
ary silos [11] which have separated biomedical and
social sciences devoted to the study of human disease
from those devoted to nonhuman disease and ecological
concerns [12, 13]. Inter-disciplinary research is called for
and required, as is interventionist practice at local, na-
tional and international levels involving: policymakers,
planners, regulators, physicians, veterinarians, ecologists,
public and animal health officials, environmental health
officers, microbiologists, and other allied natural and so-
cial scientists [10, 14].
Although principally associated with EID prevention
and control, One Health is also relevant to prevention
and control of endemic and zoonotic animal diseases, as
well as securing food safety [15, 16]. Considering the
magnitude and complexity of global issues surrounding
infectious disease and food security, the One Health ap-
proach has the potential to provide the creative, effective
and sustainable solutions required.
Despite its strong motivating rationale, implementing
a One Health approach can be challenging. Dealing with
EIDs in an integrated and considered manner can be
highly problematic, especially in the face of a perceived
crisis. In this paper we examine the socio-political, eth-
ical and legal considerations implied by a One Health
approach to EIDs. First we describe how a One Health
approach could galvanise and enhance current capacity
in EID prevention and control. Making reference to case
examples, we then identify and characterise socio-
political, ethical and legal concerns that have the poten-
tial to limit the effectiveness of One Health interven-
tions. Finally, we draw on this data to provide guidance
as to how these concerns and issues might be addressed,
and point to remaining challenges to the likely success
of the One Health approach to EID control and
prevention.
Methods
In order to explore the broader implications of a One
Health approach we employed philosophical and qualita-
tive methods to map existing and potential scientific,
ethical and political responses to EIDs in Australia and
our region. The overarching philosophical approach is
that of developing sustained arguments that critically
analyse the existing literature and reconceptualise or re-
fine key concepts. This conceptual information is often
observed in exemplars and paradigm cases. In particular
we focused on materials pertaining to the social, political
and ethical consequences of responses to the risks posed
to human health and wellbeing by Hendra virus [HeV],
Nipah virus [NiV] and Rabies virus [RbV] in Australasia,
and compared them with international responses to ca-
nonical examples of pandemic and food borne zoonoses
– severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [17] and
bovine spongiform encephalitis/variant Creutzfeldt Jacob
disease (BSE/vCJD), respectively. A synopsis of the char-
acteristics and burdens of these diseases and the patho-
gens that cause them are outlined in Boxes 1 and 2.
Because our aim was to generate inductive insights
and develop a robust set of arguments – rather than a
comprehensive catalogue of every case example or publi-
cation – the sample evolved iteratively from searches of
textual sources such as publicly available international
(e.g. WHO) and government reports; academic data-
bases (e.g. PubMed); online/print news services (Factiva);
organizational newsfeeds (Centers for Disease Control);
and the websites of major One Health collaborations
[18]. Materials in the sample were read and qualitatively
reviewed through an iterative process of testing, revising
and refining our definitions, principles and theoretical
generalisations [19, 20] – against the emerging concep-
tual map and feedback from the research team. Led by
the first author, this cycle of searching, mapping and
critical analysis continued until a period where new text-
ual materials were not providing substantive new in-
sights and the team was confident that a position of
conceptual saturation had been achieved. In what
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follows we draw on these analyses and reflections to de-
scribe the content, context and nature of the challenges
that need to be faced for the effective implementation of
a One Health approach to EID control and prevention.
Findings
EID prevention and control strategies require a One Health
approach
One Health is a holistic approach that emphasizes,
but is not restricted to, the need to understand and
regulate the environmental context (human-animal-
ecosystem interface) of disease emergence and
expression [21]. EIDs are characterized by their com-
plexity and uncertainty as to their causes, conse-
quences and likely solutions [22]. In broad terms,
the occurrence and cross-species transmissibility of
many emerging pathogens, like Ebolavirus (EBOV)
and H7N9, arise from human activities such as
changes in land use, growth in global trade and
travel and intensification of animal husbandry prac-
tices [23–25]. The speed with which our understand-
ing of the biology and epidemiology of H7N9 has
developed demonstrates how much our ability to re-
spond to new EID threats has improved over the last
few decades. Yet despite advances in immunobiology
and genomics that have contributed to diagnostics,
therapeutics, and vaccine development, the threat of
EIDs to human health and community wellbeing
persists.
Part of the reason why EID threats remain in spite of
scientific advances, are that EID events are not simply
about pathogens jumping species barriers. The threats
posed by EIDs are comprised of complex and contingent
sets of relations that involve socioeconomic and socio-
political drivers and consequences, with the latter ex-
tending beyond the impact of the disease. The social,
cultural and economic impacts of zoonoses are signifi-
cant. The examples contained in Tables 1 and 2 demon-
strate the difficult balance between the human health
risks and socioeconomic and cultural costs of EID con-
trol [26, 27]. Policy decisions should be based on sound
evidence – but it is often the case in dealing with EIDs
that the evidence required is absent or fluid. EID events
are often dynamic situations that are characterised by
uncertainty. As events unfold new evidence is created.
Consequently decisions made on the basis of present
data can be seen as wrong in the future, as more evi-
dence and a better understanding emerges.
Official reviews of canonical EID events such SARS
[17] and BSE/vCJD [28] share two key findings: (i) that
actions to reduce risk should not be predicated on scien-
tific certainty; and (ii) that policies to deal with the risks
and effects of an EID need to be founded on widely held
values, so that people understand, in advance, the kinds
of choices that will have to be made. This suggests that
the One Health approach needs more than inter-sectoral
collaboration and robust health legislation, as the unique
nature of EIDs critically limits the effectiveness of scien-
tific, top-down and technocratic approaches to govern-
ance [29].
Table 1 EIDs of immediate importance to Australasia
Hendra virus infection is endemic among at least two species of flying
fox in Australia and causes rare, but catastrophic, human infection [85].
Loss of habitat has led to increasingly intense incursions of flying foxes
into populated rural and peri-urban areas and promoted the ‘spill-over’
of Hendra virus into horses and then to people [86]. Hundreds of people
have been directly exposed to Hendra virus, with seven confirmed
human infections and four deaths since 1994. With over one hundred
dead horses and persistent risk, the emergence of Hendra has had
significant impact on equine and tourist industries in north eastern
Australia, diverted major research resources and caused significant
distress and controversy in the broader community [31, 87].
Nipah virus, a close relative of Hendra, is endemic in East Asian flying fox
populations. In 1999, after a program of deforestation and agricultural
development in Eastern Malaysia it spread to pigs then humans and
other animals, causing respiratory disease and severe encephalitis [88]. It
subsequently was reported in India and Bangladesh. Humans can be
infected directly from bats, by ingestion of contaminated food and from
other humans. Among 522 confirmed human cases, the overall mortality
was greater than 50 % [89]. Nipah control programs devastated
Malaysia’s pig industry and caused high unemployment and dislocation
of rural populations, at a cost of more than US$1 billion to the national
economy [90]. Nipah virus has been identified by WHO as a likely cause
of future pandemics.
Rabies virus infects the central nervous systems of people, wildlife and
domestic mammals. The disease is transmitted by bites from infected
animals and once it becomes symptomatic, it is virtually always fatal.
55,000 people die and 7.5 million receive post exposure prophylaxis
annually, costing $124 billion [91]. Rabies is endemic in much of South
East Asia but its range is expanding. Focusing on Australia, the
continent is free from Rabies, but the current expansion of the disease
in Indonesia [92] is a genuine threat to northern regions. Although likely
controllable in domestic dog populations [93], if Rabies were to become
endemic amongst wild or feral animals in this setting, current modelling
indicates it would be almost impossible to eradicate [94].
Table 2 Significant historical (i.e. effectively eradicated) EIDs
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a human respiratory infection,
caused by a coronavirus isolated from Chinese horseshoe bats [95]. It
was first reported in Asia in 2003 and, within a few months, spread to
thirty seven countries in the Americas, Europe and Asia. It affected more
than 8000 people and caused 774 deaths, before being successfully
eliminated by concerted international efforts. The outbreak and fear that
another pandemic could occur are estimated to have cost Canadian
and east Asian economies US$200 billion [27].
Bovine spongiform encephalitis/variant Creutzfeldt Jacob disease (BSE/
vCJD) is a rare but fatal human neurodegenerative condition, caused by
consumption of bovine products contaminated with the prions that
cause BSE. Since vCJD was first identified in 1996, 175 cases have been
reported in the UK and forty nine elsewhere. The World Bank estimates
that the direct costs of vCJD/BSE to date exceed more than US $11
billion. Infected herds and the control measure imposed to prevent
further infections devastated agricultural communities. The impacts of
the emergence of a new zoonotic disease amongst the British public
were far broader than agriculture, including the cessation of UK plasma
production because of potential iatrogenic infection. With an estimated
one in 4000 UK residents carrying vCJD, the burdens will continue well
into this century [96].
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Implementing a One Health approach faces socio-political,
ethical and legal challenges
The success of One Health depends on more than scien-
tific knowledge and technical achievement because some
of the issues that arise in addressing EID risks are so-
called ‘wicked problems’ [30]. When a new EID threat
emerges there are rarely ready-made solutions and
health policymakers and practitioners are often forced to
make tragic choices that may contravene widely held
values. Considerations must include the need to protect
public health and the wider social, economic and envir-
onmental impacts of proposed interventions. Economic
and political interests can complicate the decision-
makers’ motives and decision-maker uncertainty is com-
pounded by policy decisions becoming entangled in pol-
itical, ethical and legal considerations [31–33]. As events
surrounding the EBOV outbreak in West Africa illus-
trate, the importance placed on a specific EID threat at
any one time also depends on who is setting the agenda
[34]. Therefore to be successfully implemented, the One
Health approach must address a range of socio-political,
ethical and legal challenges that arise as a consequence
of the spread of infection within and between species.
Most of these challenges are not unique to One Health,
but are shared by any approach to addressing EIDs.
However these challenges frequently go unrecognized.
In the following section we will clarify the nature of
these issues so they can be addressed later in the paper.
(1)Socio-political challenges
A focus on individualism, perceptions, short term so-
lutions, populism and avoiding controversy are features
of political life, which can prove challenging for EID pol-
icy and work against developing effective strategies for
addressing EIDs.
Policy responses to EID events such as Nipah and
Hendra virus infections (outlined in Box 1) tend to focus
on necessary and proximal causes (what individuals do
to put themselves at direct risk from an infectious
pathogen) because the science about other aspects of
EIDs is often complex, uncertain and lacking a clear nar-
rative. Compounding this, our moral psychologies have
evolved to respond to direct harms – not indirect distal
causal stories. Many people in liberal democracies be-
lieve that they are entitled to rights and freedoms that
cannot be sacrificed merely for the marginal gains of
others. As the discourse surrounding climate change and
other wicked problems illustrates, this promotes techno-
logical solutions because they do not require substantive
changes in human behaviours and underlying values sys-
tems. [35] The net result is that the policy focus for EID
prevention and control tends to remain on individual
behaviours rather than the structural drivers of
emergence and transmission – a case example being the
focus on vaccine development and the husbandry prac-
tices of horse owners in response to the zoonotic risks
of Hendra virus [31, 36]..
The political impetus for action in response to many
EIDs is not necessarily scientific evidence but societal
perceptions. Indeed, in the face of scientific uncertainty
and ethical ambiguity, ideological perspectives and
short-term political considerations often supplant efforts
to devise effective long-term interventions [28, 37].
Political imperatives to avoid, or at least minimise,
public concern whilst dealing with EIDs can also prove
challenging. In the case of BSE, powerful interests domi-
nated early government responses, leading policymakers
to make decisions that avoided public controversy, but
had major economic consequences. As the crisis un-
folded, expertise became politicized leading to conflict
between agencies and policy inconsistency between
health communication strategies and the measures being
taken to minimize the risks to human health [38]. Even
when the link between BSE and vCJD became clear,
existing feed bans were poorly enforced and risk com-
munication was dominated by fear of public panic [39];
even as the decision was made to remove all potential
sources of human infection from the UK food supply,
messages were confused and policy implementation im-
peded by poor co-ordination between agencies [28].
A common but problematic response to EID threats
has been to invoke the precautionary principle. Roughly
speaking, the precautionary principle can be applied in
situations where human activities create a scientifically
plausible, but uncertain, risk of significant harm. In re-
sponse the principle advocates that actions ought to be
taken to avoid or reduce the harm, and that these ac-
tions need to be proportionate to the seriousness of the
potential harm. In other word, in the absence of evi-
dence take a conservative approach.
However applying the precautionary principle to EIDs
in an attempt to protect the public can result in what, in
retrospect, amounts to an excessive response. This oc-
curred with attempts to control Nipah infection, where
significant damage was inflicted on industry, livelihoods
and the economy. Similarly, experience with highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in China and
SE-Asia showed that overzealous policy responses can
destroy livelihoods and threaten food supplies [40, 41].
In Vietnam alone, almost 40 million birds were culled in
2004 in an attempt to eradicate HPAI. Although many
birds were owned by large commercial operations,
others were kept by ‘backyard’ farmers and villagers.
Mass culling of poultry appears decisive, but places ex-
cessive burdens on vulnerable populations, is ineffective
in the context of extensive ‘backyard’ poultry farming
and can, in fact, promote the spread of disease [42]. A
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similar scenario is currently playing out with Rabies con-
trol in Bali.
Unfortunately, the precautionary principle and analytic
tools and concepts appealed to in this domain, fail to de-
liver what is required at times of EID outbreaks since
they do not advance public engagement or help resolve
disagreements in times of uncertainty [43, 44]. Philo-
sophical critiques of the precautionary principle applied
to EIDs have also shown its limitations, including that
defining criteria by which to judge a threat as plausible
and a response proportionate, often will only substitute
one uncertainty for two others [45].
(2)Ethical challenges
The effectiveness of an EID control policy will depend
on the context of its implementation and particularly its
alignment with stakeholder and public values [17, 46]. In
modern liberal democracies at least some consensus
over what is in the public interest and an understanding
of the values which support it, is therefore required for
the successful implementation of EID responses. Yet this
is precisely what has been lacking in outbreaks where
fracture lines, differences and value conflicts have be-
come apparent. When the stakes are high, evidence and
the implications of actions are uncertain, the situation is
complex and resources may be limited but where deci-
sions need to be made, differences are exposed. Such dif-
ferences could be around beliefs about how to deal with
ecological and environmental issues, which may conflict
with the importance people attach to public goods, pro-
tection of individual autonomy and animal welfare [47].
These conditions of crisis and division are conducive to
undesirable consequences including public fear, mistrust,
misinformation and non-compliance with public health
directives. For example in Canada during the SARS cri-
sis, leaders were unprepared for the range of ethical con-
flicts that arose, including those over: individual freedom
versus the common good; healthcare workers’ safety ver-
sus their duty to care for the sick; and economic costs
versus the need for containment [48]. As indicated in
Box 2, both the outbreak itself and fear that another
outbreak could occur had significant economic
consequences.
Any approach which hopes to successfully respond to
EID threats, including a One Health approach, needs to
address the ethical concerns articulated above. To this
end, potentially conflicting values and logic must be ne-
gotiated to realise effective, sustainable and just solu-
tions. Prioritisation and resource allocation require
political processes based on fundamental ethical ques-
tions about what is valuable, what is to be protected
and, ultimately, what is dispensable. To be effective,
public policy must be consistent with the values of
citizens to whom it is applied, otherwise it can become
mired in controversy about whose values should prevail
[31, 37, 49]. Therefore, one of the first and most import-
ant tasks of policy work is to establish how the public
interest is best defined.
(3)Legal challenges
The legal environment in which EID policy is made
and in which responses to outbreaks occur, presents its
own set of challenges. The law surrounding EID re-
sponses in most jurisdictions is diffuse, complicated and
often subject to re-interpretation on the basis of whose
interests are given primacy at the time decisions are
made. Moreover, in many countries different approaches
by State/Provincial and local authorities, overlaid by
Federal/National powers, complicate regulation so much
that ‘hard law’ is often replaced by resort to ‘soft law’ of
executive and administrative powers and international
instruments, such as the International Health Regula-
tions (IHR) [50]. This may add complexity and confu-
sion to the EID regulatory structures, rather than
facilitating public health responses to a new threat. Such
confusion provides a salient reminder that even in ‘glo-
bal law’ approaches to EIDs, the sovereign state remains
the institution responsible for regulation and control
[51].
Public health law responses to EIDs tend to be ori-
ented towards controlling cross-border pathogen trans-
fer and community outbreaks rather than the underlying
deficiencies and structural conditions from which the
threats emerge. Other laws, such as environmental law,
may be more useful in addressing structural conditions
for emergence. Changes in land use and agricultural in-
tensification in developing societies are major drivers of
EID. However, the cost of laws that restrict development
may be greater global health inequities, with consequen-
tial effects for health outcomes. In order to clarify EID-
related legal tensions between economic development
and health security, a more explicit recognition is
needed of who are the primary beneficiaries and who
bears the costs of a One Health approach to EIDs [52].
Legal clarity around the frameworks designed to pro-
tect populations from EIDs is critical to providing an en-
abling infrastructure to co-ordinate and support the One
Health-based work of policymakers, development plan-
ners, human and animal health-workers and biosecurity
agencies.
Discussion
One health and public values: implications for EID control
and prevention
The health of humans, animals, and ecosystems are in-
terconnected. A One Health approach promises a better
Degeling et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:1307 Page 5 of 11
understanding of how to prevent and control EIDs at
the human-animal-ecosystem interface. However the
socio-political, ethical and legal challenges of EIDs illus-
trated above highlight how responses to infectious dis-
ease threats are intrinsically value laden. When a new
infectious pathogen such as Hendra or Nipah virus first
appears, or a known threat such as Rabies or Ebola
encroaches on a new setting, there is limited scientific
evidence or past experience to guide decisions or deter-
mine whether a planned response will be proportionate.
Vastly different interpretations of EID events and their
likely outcomes might be supported by the available
data. Policymakers and practitioners therefore have little
guidance as to what they should do when faced with a
nascent infectious disease threat, only what they can do.
As others [52–54] have cogently argued, they must
therefore ask themselves: whose health is being priori-
tized; which public and which good are we seeking to
protect?
Notwithstanding recognition of a need for comple-
mentary work on values-based questions that inevitably
surround EID risks and EID control, the adoption of the
One Health approach, so far, has not included develop-
ment of a comprehensive, ethically-informed policy and
implementation framework; this has limited its practical
utility [9, 55]. Despite rhetorical and some financial sup-
port for One Health as the guiding ethos by which to ad-
dress interconnected human, animal and environmental
health issues, its impact will be minimal unless implica-
tions of uncertainty on, and potential conflicts between,
human values and political processes are recognised and
articulated. Any attempt to address these ethical and
normative dimensions must take into account the dy-
namic nature of EID risk management. A policy that
seems reasonable today may be inappropriate tomorrow,
in light of new evidence. And when situations are uncer-
tain, decision-makers inevitably fall back on their values.
Therefore, a solid framework based on shared values is
needed to support decision-making surrounding EIDs
when “evidence” is – or may be – unreliable, and rapidly
changing or fluid.
What is needed to guide a one health approach to EIDs?
To successfully meet the challenges described above,
particularly the necessity to align EID policy with public
values, a One Health approach needs to engage in the
following.
(i) Social science and economic research to help
catalogue and describe the drivers, mechanisms and
social and political configurations through which
EIDs become threats to human, animal and
ecological health [56, 57]. The complex connections
between individual social needs and the local
socioeconomic context of affected or at-risk
communities, need to be understood and addressed
by policymaking processes. This should ensure that
manifest injustice, livelihood-based decisions and
other social and cultural factors do not undermine
the effectiveness of favoured control measures.
Without adequate knowledge of specific local
arrangements, there is a danger that insufficiently
nuanced or unified approaches to EIDs will actually
undermine the heterogeneous relationships and
contingent practices that make health possible in
circumstances of structural disadvantage [56, 58].
The social sciences are analytically broader and more
policy focussed than the natural sciences. Whereas the
natural sciences tend to frame infectious disease threats
narrowly as matters of biological integrity and security,
such that barrier technologies and hygiene practices
dominate the logic of interventions [59], social science
approaches go beyond this. Building social scientific evi-
dence for use in conjunction with natural scientific evi-
dence about EIDs aligns with the growing realization
that EID emergence is as much about the social and eco-
nomic configuration of capital flow as it is about the bio-
logical features of host-pathogen interactions. Current
approaches to the economic and structural drivers of
EID emergence still presume that state and market neo-
liberalism is part of the natural order, even as evidence
is mounting that these systems of development are cen-
tral to the problem [60, 61]. Moreover, the current em-
phasis on microbiology and focus on newer molecular
techniques to characterise pathogens, is drawing atten-
tion away from developing better understandings of the
environmental, economic and social drivers of EIDs.
While this is understandable given the desire for vac-
cines and drugs to solve EIDs, if One Health researchers
and practitioners broaden their approach to causality to
include upstream, social and economic systemic causes,
questions and issues that have been traditionally brack-
eted or thought best avoided will become central to the
cross-sectoral collaboration implied by One Health.
(ii)The development of a One Health Analytic
Framework (OHAF) needs to be pursued. Such a
framework would catalogue case-based experiences
and reflect the particular dynamics of specific EIDs,
and promote inter-sectoral collaboration and know-
ledge synthesis, including integration of information
about social, cultural and economic impacts, control
measures and uncertainty [62, 63]. The framework
would serve as a prompt to ensure that minority
perspectives are represented and all relevant
concerns are considered. An OHAF could provide a
rubric for comparisons between outbreaks. This
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would allow the inherent complexities of economic
and societal responses to EIDs to be compared, to
inform policy processes. It is vital for discussions
about EID prevention and control to have this kind of
sound empirical foundation, because uncertainty and
media coverage have the potential to drive bad policy.
Development of an OHAF could be facilitated by
adopting well established and methodically rigorous
processes such as Framework Analysis, produced by the
National Centre for Social Research (UK) [19], or Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis [MCDA] developed within the
field of decision science [64]. In the first instance Frame-
work Analysis would allow for systematic incorporation
of the perspectives and contributions of different schol-
arly disciplines and expert stakeholders. Framework
Analysis facilitates movement between different datasets,
thematic areas, theoretical resources, and levels of
abstraction without loss of conceptual clarity [65]. The
Framework method is used to organize and manage re-
search and interpretation through the process of
summarization, which is codified into a robust and flex-
ible matrix that allows the policymaker/researcher to
analyze data both by case and theme. It is commonly
used in areas such as health research, policy develop-
ment and program evaluation. Equally, MCDA methods
offer an alternative and potentially complementary
approach to OHAF development. Comprised of a suite
of analytic strategies, MCDA have been shown to be
valuable tools for prioritization and decision-making in
animal and human health [64]. MCDA provides a frame-
work to compare policy alternatives with diverse and
often intangible impacts, which can be particularly use-
ful in determining and justifying the prioritization and
mobilization of limited research and public health re-
sources [66, 67].
(iii)Genuine processes of public engagement across the
developed and developing world are also essential to
a successful One Health approach. These processes
are not so much about engaging in deliberative
democracy for policy decision-making, as about de-
fining the principles and values that should guide
decision-making. This means procedural inclusive-
ness alone is not enough to ensure transparency and
reflexivity, to capture people’s preferences and to ef-
fectively communicate with the public [68].
The successful implementation of the One Health ap-
proach to EIDs will depend on public trust and co-
operation. Public support for unpalatable measures is
more likely if citizens understand the issues, and policy
implementation reflects community values and prefer-
ences. To this end, citizens’ juries have been employed
in the UK, Australia, the US and elsewhere [69–72] to
explore similar issues and identify citizens’ preferences.
They represent informed public opinion better than
other social research methods (e.g. surveys or focus
groups) because they give participants factual informa-
tion, bring them into a structured and constructive dia-
logue with experts, provide them with time to reflect
and deliberate, and allow them to represent their views
directly to policymakers.
(iv)The development of a clear Statement of Principles
and Values (SPV) for integration of ethical
principles and values into decision-making is needed.
This should be based on empirical data about peo-
ple’s beliefs, including which public health outcomes
and public goods should be prioritized and why;
how to adjudicate conflicting claims and preferences;
and what levels and types of evidence should be pri-
vileged in these decisions.
To be successful, One Health needs to be about more
than disease prevention and control. The dynamic, un-
predictable effects and risks to peoples’ lives of EIDs ne-
cessitate a public health and biosecurity infrastructure
equipped to address the ethical problems that arise. EID
management must therefore be based on normative
principles as well as local knowledge, operational experi-
ence and disease-specific scientific and economic evi-
dence. This means that governments and policy-makers
need to explain and justify the values that underlie
decision-making and engage the public in discussions
about ethical choices, so that when difficult decisions
arise in the face of uncertainty, they will be accepted as
fair and essential for the public good [47]. This necessi-
tates that the guiding values and likely ethical choices
need to be articulated in a formal statement in advance,
as in the heat of emerging health threat, decision makers
will be under pressure from many sources to ‘do some-
thing quickly’.
(v)Integration of an OHAF and SPV with the IHR and
relevant national health and biosecurity legislation is
essential so that policymakers and practitioners can
dynamically test their decision-making.
Our response should of course be based on the best
scientific evidence, but EIDs are not just scientific issues,
they also have significant social, ethical and animal
rights dimensions. Experiences of infectious disease
threats such as BSE/vCJD and SARS indicate that there
have been problems combining evidence and human
values at both local and policy levels [28, 73]. The com-
municability of diseases between species raises social,
ethical and legal issues that have not been clearly
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elucidated or adequately addressed. Our response to
nonhuman animal disease is not determined solely by
bio-scientific knowledge; the way people and animals live
with and amongst each other is also shaped by social
norms, economic imperatives and human values. In mat-
ters of public health it is no longer sufficient to ask what
works and what is the strength of the evidence; we also
need to ask ethical questions about how we should seek
to live, and what is the right thing to do [74–76]. Con-
sensus about the best approaches to EID control and
prevention are not always possible, however an agreed
set of guiding principles and values can be a means to
ensure dialogue, if not always agreement.
The development of an OHAF and SPV will also pro-
mote clearer communication about public risk. Signifi-
cant EID threats have major implications for distribution
of scarce resources, access to and regulation of health
services and maintenance of social order. As described
above it is also clear that policy and legal responses to
EID threats are often highly politicised and compro-
mised by failure to communicate clearly with the public.
Policymakers responsible for responding to disasters
such as EIDs typically find that there is a dissonance be-
tween transparency that may appear alarmist versus
withholding information to avoid panic. Regardless of
advice, people will make their own decisions based on
their interpretation of available information, from formal
and informal channels. So public communication, before
and during a public health emergency, is frequently as
important as political decisions and regulatory changes
[39, 77]. This means that, to be effective, a One Health
approach – like any EID policy – must deal with scien-
tific uncertainty, whilst addressing the socio-political,
ethical and legal dimensions of effective health commu-
nication and intervention strategies [3]. By exposing
decision-making processes to reveal the scientific and
normative uncertainties and ethical complexities, the
introduction of an OHAF and a SPV into One Health
theory and practice may incorporate iterative deliber-
ation and learning into EID policy processes.
(vi)Finally, One Health must be about genuine reform
rather than merely rhetoric. A One Health approach
rests on the assumption that the cross-sectoral inte-
gration of expertise, research methodologies and
public health infrastructure will inevitably improve
capacity for disease-risk prediction and effective
intervention. However, calls for increased inter-
sectoral co-operation by public health practitioners,
clinicians, scientists and policy-makers are not a new
phenomenon. For example in the 1990s advocates of
“new public health” called for health authorities to
turn their attention to the social, economic and
environmental factors that affect health – requiring
the realignment and policy integration of Health
Departments with other government agencies
[78, 79]. Unfortunately in this case as others,
attempts at promoting inter-sectoral approaches
rarely move beyond rhetoric – even when driven by
the best intentions and supported by substantial
resources [80–82].
The problem is that arguments that promote the need
for greater co-operation between sectors tend to focus
on the likely benefits of collaboration rather than what
reform would entail – that is, what needs to be done or-
ganisationally and politically to achieve the desired out-
comes [83]. Established ‘sectors’ – whether orientated
towards human or animal health, agriculture or the en-
vironment – have genealogies, traditions and rationali-
ties of “what we are here for” that have been shaped by
social, political and administrative processes [11]. As in-
stitutions, they are philosophically and structurally re-
sistant to change that diverts resources and re-orients
practices away from their own sectoral priorities [83]. In
essence, they have their own constituencies to serve. As
a consequence, establishment and implementation of
mechanisms that enhance information-sharing, collabor-
ation and inter-sectoral co-operation, such as working
groups and interdepartmental committees, have rarely
delivered the outcomes promised in the past. Responses
to BSE/vCJD in the UK [28], HPAI in South East Asia
[11], and recent case studies of One Health programs in
Uganda [84], suggest that more work is needed to co-
ordinate implementation and overcome sectoral inter-
ests. The complexity of the problems posed by EIDs
mean that organising effective control and prevention
programs will require genuine cross-sectoral integration
and, potentially, re-sectoring of some institutional and
professional responsibilities [62]. And as the recent Ebo-
lavirus disease outbreak illustrates, there must also be
sustained social and political willingness to achieve
control.
If One Health is genuinely the way forward, as we be-
lieve it is, then we should do more than talk about its
potential benefits. Without genuine cross-sectoral re-
form and a radical broadening of the scope of its inquiry
into how specific social, cultural and spatial configura-
tions promote the risks of EID emergence, One Health
is in danger of becoming merely a rhetorical strategy to
avoid conflict between its core disciplines, whereby prac-
titioners, researchers and policymakers will espouse the
methodological and moral case for interdisciplinary col-
laboration yet remain in their silos [11]. Even if these
barriers are overcome the One Health approach will only
succeed if it explicitly acknowledges local contingent
and contextual dimensions of disease risk and disease
expression and the political impacts of scientific
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uncertainty, while also seeking to accommodate the
values and preferences of ‘at risk’ and affected individ-
uals. Further, we suggest that decision making around
EIDs requires an ethical framework that reflects the
values of affected and ‘at risk’ communities, privileges
justice, takes account of human flourishing, protects ani-
mal health and welfare and is developed in consultation
with relevant stakeholders and the public.
Conclusions
EID risk management is a major global public health
issue to which One Health represents a promising ap-
proach, but its potential benefits have not been fully rea-
lised [53, 55]. Despite recognition that the social and
cultural dimensions are critical to the success of One
Health, social scientists are yet to play a central or sub-
stantive role in shaping research programs and interven-
tions [12, 13]. At the same time as the literature on the
ethics of pandemic responses and preparedness con-
tinues to grow, the One Health approach to EIDs has re-
ceived little formal ethical consideration. Even the most
ethically attuned existing frameworks for biosecurity and
infection prevention and control provide only general
operational principles that do not guide actions in times
of uncertainty. If One Health is to be meaningful − let
alone successful −more attention must be paid to how
these different types of knowledge are brought together
and brought to public attention. Effective responses to
EIDs are likely to be delayed or precluded unless all the
socio-political, ethical and legal implications are articu-
lated, publicly debated and − as far as possible − resolved
in advance. Policy makers and public health experts need
a set of principles and values, developed and articulated
prior to an outbreak that explicitly acknowledge the
preferences of affected communities and can guide inte-
gration of new evidence into decision-making processes
in a dynamic manner.
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